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llm4s-docs/org.llm4s/org.llm4s.toolapi/org.llm4s.toolapi.builtin/org.llm4s.toolapi.builtin.http/HttpConfig

HttpConfig

org.llm4s.toolapi.builtin.http.HttpConfig
See theHttpConfig companion object
case class HttpConfig(allowedDomains: Option[Seq[String]], blockedDomains: Seq[String], blockInternalIPs: Boolean, maxResponseSize: Long, timeout: FiniteDuration, followRedirects: Boolean, maxRedirects: Int, allowedMethods: Seq[String], userAgent: String, redirectSafeHeaders: Seq[String])

Configuration for HTTP tool.

== Security == By default, HTTPTool is configured with safe defaults:

  • Only GET and HEAD methods are allowed (read-only)
  • Internal IP ranges are blocked (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, IPv6 unique-local fc00::/7, ...)
  • Cloud metadata endpoints are blocked (169.254.169.254)
  • Localhost and loopback addresses are blocked

Value parameters

allowedDomains

Optional list of allowed domains. If None, all domains are allowed. A leading www. is ignored.

allowedMethods

HTTP methods that are allowed (default: GET, HEAD for safety).

blockInternalIPs

Whether to block requests to internal/private IP ranges (default: true).

blockedDomains

List of domains that are always blocked. A leading www. is ignored.

followRedirects

Whether to follow HTTP redirects. Defaults to false; when true each redirect hop is re-validated against the SSRF filter before the next request is issued (open-redirect bypass prevention).

maxRedirects

Maximum number of redirects to follow.

maxResponseSize

Maximum number of response body bytes read; the rest is never read, and the result's truncated is true.

redirectSafeHeaders

The caller-set headers a redirect may carry to another origin (matched in any case). Once a hop leaves the original request's origin - its scheme, host and port, so a downgrade from https to http counts - every other header the caller set is dropped, on that hop and every later one, including one that comes back. The default is Accept, Accept-Language, Accept-Encoding, User-Agent and Content-Type, the last only on a hop that re-sends the body (a 307 or 308). A header that names a credential (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, any name core's redaction treats as sensitive, such as X-Api-Key or X-Client-Secret, and any name ending in token or key) is dropped even if listed here. Seq.empty forwards no caller-set header.

timeout

Deadline for the whole call: connecting, every redirect hop and reading the body must all finish within it (the SSRF check's name resolution too), so a server that sends slowly cannot hold the call longer. A call that runs out of time fails with a TIMEOUT: error. A zero or negative timeout fails every call; one beyond 100 years is treated as 100 years. A TIMEOUT: releases the caller, not the request: one already sent may still be delivered and acted on by the server (a write is not rolled back), and a DNS lookup cannot be interrupted, so the worker thread may outlive the deadline by up to the resolver's own timeout (#1734).

userAgent

User-Agent header to use.

Attributes

Companion
object
Graph
Supertypes
trait Serializable
trait Product
trait Equals
class Object
trait Matchable
class Any
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Members list

Value members

Concrete methods

def isDomainAllowed(domain: String): Boolean

Check if a domain is allowed based on blocklist/allowlist configuration.

Check if a domain is allowed based on blocklist/allowlist configuration.

This method performs hostname-based checks only:

  1. Hostname-based blocklist check, ignoring a leading www. in both the domain and configured entries
  2. Allowlist check (if configured)

Note: IP-based SSRF protection (DNS resolution + IP range validation) is performed at request time by the HTTP tool to avoid expensive DNS lookups during validation.

Attributes

def isMethodAllowed(method: String): Boolean

Check if a method is allowed.

Check if a method is allowed.

Attributes

def validateDomainWithSSRF(domain: String): Boolean

Validate a domain with full SSRF protection including DNS resolution.

Validate a domain with full SSRF protection including DNS resolution.

This performs both hostname-based checks and IP-based SSRF protection. Use this at request time when actually making HTTP requests.

Value parameters

domain

The domain to validate

Attributes

Returns

true if the domain is safe to access

def withAllMethods: HttpConfig

Create a copy with all HTTP methods enabled.

Create a copy with all HTTP methods enabled.

WARNING: This enables potentially destructive methods (POST, PUT, DELETE). Only use this when you trust the LLM's judgment and have appropriate safeguards.

Attributes

def withInternalIPsAllowed: HttpConfig

Create a copy with internal IP blocking disabled.

Create a copy with internal IP blocking disabled.

WARNING: This allows requests to internal networks and cloud metadata endpoints. Only use this in controlled environments where SSRF is not a concern.

Attributes

def withRedirectsEnabled: HttpConfig

Create a copy with redirect following enabled.

Create a copy with redirect following enabled.

Each redirect hop is re-validated against the SSRF filter; from the first hop that leaves the original origin (scheme, host and port) and on every hop after it, only the caller-set headers on redirectSafeHeaders are sent; and 301/302 redirects convert POST to GET per the HTTP specification.

Attributes

Inherited methods

def productElementNames: Iterator[String]

Attributes

Inherited from:
Product
def productIterator: Iterator[Any]

Attributes

Inherited from:
Product
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