Verifying Releases
Two checks answer the two questions a supply-chain review asks of a downloaded LLM4S artifact. A PGP signature says the project’s release key signed it; a build provenance attestation says which commit, tag and workflow run built it. This page shows both, with commands you can paste.
- What is signed and attested
- The release signing key
- Check a jar’s PGP signature
- Check a jar’s build provenance
- Check an SBOM
- Check the container image
- Verify in your build
- See also
What is signed and attested
| Artifact | Where | PGP signature | Build provenance |
|---|---|---|---|
Jars, sources and javadoc jars, POMs (org.llm4s:*) |
Maven Central | Yes, a .asc beside each file |
Yes |
llm4s-kotlin-api (built by Gradle) |
Maven Central | Yes | Yes |
CycloneDX SBOMs (*.bom.json) and licence reports (*.licences.csv) |
the GitHub Release | No | Yes |
workspace-runner container image |
ghcr.io/llm4s/workspace-runner |
No | Yes, stored beside the image in the registry |
Provenance is produced by release.yml
with actions/attest-build-provenance: a SLSA v1 statement signed
with a short-lived Sigstore certificate issued to the workflow, with no long-lived
key, and recorded in Sigstore’s public transparency log. Each file is attested in the job that built it, before
it is uploaded. The attestations are listed at
github.com/llm4s/llm4s/attestations.
Releases up to and including 0.6.0 were published before the workflow attested anything: they carry PGP
signatures only, and gh attestation verify finds no attestation for them.
The release signing key
The Maven Central artifacts are signed with this OpenPGP key:
| Fingerprint | 2246 615C FDEA D8F4 50C0 8555 2550 305A 740B C5E3 |
| Algorithm | ed25519 (signing), with a cv25519 encryption subkey |
| User ID | Rory Graves <rory.graves@fieldmark.co.uk> |
| Created / expires | 2025-04-03 / 2028-04-02 |
| Published on | keyserver.ubuntu.com, keys.openpgp.org |
The 0.5.0, 0.5.1 and 0.6.0 jars and POMs on Maven Central verify against it. Both keyservers serve it with its user ID; the fingerprint is what to check.
Check a jar’s PGP signature
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VERSION=0.6.0
BASE=https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/llm4s/llm4s-core_3/$VERSION
curl -sfO "$BASE/llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.jar"
curl -sfO "$BASE/llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.jar.asc"
gpg --keyserver hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys 2246615CFDEAD8F450C085552550305A740BC5E3
gpg --verify "llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.jar.asc" "llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.jar"
A good result names the key by its full fingerprint:
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gpg: using EDDSA key 2246615CFDEAD8F450C085552550305A740BC5E3
gpg: Good signature from "Rory Graves <rory.graves@fieldmark.co.uk>" [unknown]
The WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! that follows is about your own web of trust,
not the signature: compare the fingerprint with the table above.
Check a jar’s build provenance
With the GitHub CLI (2.49 or later), on a jar downloaded as above:
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gh attestation verify "llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.jar" -R llm4s/llm4s \
--signer-workflow llm4s/llm4s/.github/workflows/release.yml
gh hashes the file, looks up attestations for that digest, checks the Sigstore signature and the transparency
log entry, and checks that the certificate was issued to a workflow of llm4s/llm4s. --signer-workflow
additionally requires that the release workflow, not some other workflow of the repository, built it. The
output names the source commit and the tag the run was started from; --format json prints the full statement.
To check every artifact of a release at once, use the release script’s attestation mode:
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scripts/verify-release.sh "$VERSION" --attestations
It downloads each published jar (the POM for the BOM and the relocation stubs) from Maven Central and runs
gh attestation verify on it, then checks the container image.
Check an SBOM
The SBOMs and licence reports are assets of the GitHub Release for the tag (Software Bill of Materials),
and are attested there, by the release workflow’s sbom job. They are not published to Maven Central: releases up to
0.6.0 also uploaded a -cyclonedx.json beside each module there, which carries a PGP signature but no attestation.
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gh release download "v$VERSION" -R llm4s/llm4s -p "llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.bom.json"
gh attestation verify "llm4s-core_3-$VERSION.bom.json" -R llm4s/llm4s \
--signer-workflow llm4s/llm4s/.github/workflows/release.yml
Check the container image
The provenance of workspace-runner is bound to the image’s digest and stored in the registry beside it:
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gh attestation verify "oci://ghcr.io/llm4s/workspace-runner:$VERSION" -R llm4s/llm4s \
--signer-workflow llm4s/llm4s/.github/workflows/release.yml
A tag can be moved; a digest cannot. Once verified, pull and deploy the image by the digest gh reports
(ghcr.io/llm4s/workspace-runner@sha256:...) rather than by its tag.
Verify in your build
Maven
The pgpverify-maven-plugin checks the signature of every dependency. Pin the LLM4S group to the release key in its keys map:
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# keysmap.list
org.llm4s = 0x2246615CFDEAD8F450C085552550305A740BC5E3
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mvn org.simplify4u.plugins:pgpverify-maven-plugin:check -DkeysMapLocation=keysmap.list
Gradle
Gradle’s dependency verification
checks signatures and checksums from gradle/verification-metadata.xml. Generate it, then trust the release
key for the group:
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./gradlew --write-verification-metadata pgp,sha256 help
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<!-- gradle/verification-metadata.xml, inside <configuration><trusted-keys> -->
<trusted-key id="2246615CFDEAD8F450C085552550305A740BC5E3" group="org.llm4s"/>
sbt
sbt has no built-in signature check. Check the jars it resolved with the commands above, or with
gh attestation verify on each file in the Coursier cache (cs fetch org.llm4s:llm4s-core_3:$VERSION prints
their paths).
See also
- Software Bill of Materials: what the SBOMs cover and how they are scanned
- Release Process: how a release is cut, and the checks run after it
- Security Reference: the threat model